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Brown v. Plata: The Struggle to 
Harmonize Human Dignity with 
the Constitution 
 
Benjamin F. Krolikowski* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In May 2011, the Supreme Court decided the case of 
Brown v. Plata, affirming a lower court’s decision to grant a 
prison population reduction order in accordance with the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), affecting the 
imprisonment of thousands of prisoners in the State of 
California.1 The nature of the Court’s decision makes Plata 
perhaps the most noteworthy prisoners’ rights decision of the 
past quarter-century.2 In reaching this decision, the Court 
applied the provisions of the PLRA governing the grant of 
prison population reduction orders.3 Despite the seemingly 
simple application of the PLRA, understanding this decision 
requires one to examine the Court’s recognition of the human 
dignity of all persons, even those who have voluntarily forfeited 
some portion of their liberty by committing crime, and its role 
in determining the content of important constitutional rights. 
Human dignity as a constitutional value has affected the 
Court’s decision-making only since the 1940’s.4 In the ensuing 
 
  * J.D. Candidate – Pace University School of Law, May 2013. I would 
like to first thank my family and friends for their love and support 
throughout the writing of this Article and my time in law school, without it I 
would not be where I am today. I would also like to thank Professor Michael 
B. Mushlin, who was instrumental in providing the spark that inspired my 
research in this area of the law—without his encouragement, constant 
guidance, and keen interest in my writing, this Article would never have 
escaped beyond my mind’s eye. 
1. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. ____, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
2. 3 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 17:1.60 (4th ed. Supp. 
2009). 
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2006). 
4. Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. 
1
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seventy years the Court has increasingly relied on human 
dignity as a value considered in its interpretation of the 
Constitution. Even philosophically estranged members of the 
Court have found common ground on the issue.5 
In Plata, the Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, held that prisoners alleging 
conditions of confinement claims retain some degree of human 
dignity despite their lawful incarceration.6 Accordingly, federal 
courts must enforce the constitutional rights of prisoners when 
they are violated, even if this culminates in the release of some 
individuals from captivity. This is in stark contrast to previous 
cases where the federal courts have simply deferred to the 
judgment of prison administrators.7 Plata emphatically affirms 
the judiciary’s role in protecting prisoners’ rights, noting that 
court inaction in the face of ongoing and persistent 
constitutional violations cannot remain simply because of 
prison administrators’ protestations and despite the admittedly 
radical nature of the remedy being considered.8 
Part II of this Article briefly discusses the evolution of 
human dignity as a constitutional value during the course of 
the twentieth century. This Article will explain the 
philosophical development of human dignity in general terms 
and as it was developed by the Supreme Court, with some 
particular attention given the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Part III will discuss Plata and its underlying 
facts. Part IV concerns how Plata may influence the use of 
human dignity as a constitutional value in the years to come, 
specifically discussing the relationship between Plata and the 
troublesome 2012 decision: Florence v. Board of Chosen 
Freeholders.9 As a result of cases like Plata and Florence, the 
vitality of human dignity as a constitutional value today 
 
REV. 169, 188 (2011). 
5. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1928 (majority opinion by Kennedy, J.); Nat’l 
Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680-81 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., 
concurring); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (majority opinion 
by Frankfurter, J.). 
6. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1928. 
7. 1 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 1:3 (4th ed. 2009). 
8. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1928-29. 
9. 566 U.S. ____, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/9
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remains somewhat in flux. However, this is not to say that it is 
irrelevant to the Court’s decision-making process. Only as 
future cases are decided will commentators be able to 
determine which case holds greater import in the area of 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and thus evaluate the 
durability of human dignity as a constitutional concern. 
 
II. Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value 
 
A. Human Dignity & Philosophy 
 
Human dignity has only recently emerged as a value 
relevant to interpreting the Constitution.10 Moreover, it is a 
concept that is not susceptible to easy definition. The 
ephemeral nature of human dignity has led some legal scholars 
to declare that human dignity is either not an independent 
constitutional value, or that human dignity can be reduced to 
another, more concrete and readily discernible value like 
personal autonomy or equality.11 Despite the philosophic 
debate, it is increasingly apparent that the Supreme Court has 
relied on some human dignity value, whatever that may be, in 
reaching decisions on a wide-ranging number of issues.12 
Human dignity originated separately as both a religious 
and philosophical concept. The religious underpinnings of 
human dignity derive from the Judeo-Christian belief that all 
human beings are created in the image of God.13 Each 
individual therefore contains a fragment of the so-called “divine 
spark,” imbuing him or her with a dignity that cannot be 
denied or in any way disparaged by others.14 This conception of 
human dignity explains rudimentary notions of human 
equality, best demonstrated by the retributivist belief in “blood 
for blood” that is enshrined in many ancient legal and religious 
 
10. Henry, supra note 4, at 188. 
11. Id. at 182-85. 
12. See Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 753 (2006). 
13. Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 
14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 201, 205 (2008). 
14. Id. at 206. 
3
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texts.15 
Philosophically, the idea that human dignity is a source of 
human rights can be traced to the work of the eighteenth 
century German philosopher Immanuel Kant.16 Kant based his 
understanding of human dignity on the individual autonomy he 
believed was possessed by all people.17 Individual autonomy, to 
Kant, was the same as positive freedom, which is derived from 
a person’s inherent rationality and ability to self-govern.18 
Kant’s conception of human dignity is particularly interesting 
in examining human dignity as a constitutional value because 
his work was an intellectual product of the Enlightenment, 
much like the Constitution. This is not to imply that Kant’s 
philosophy directly inspired the Framers in drafting the 
Constitution; however, it does show that political and legal 
thought at the time was concerned to some degree with human 
equality and its relationship to the inherent dignity of all 
people.19 
 
B.  The Supreme Court and Human Dignity 
 
During the first 150 years of the Nation’s existence, the 
word “dignity” appeared in Supreme Court opinions to describe 
only the sovereignty possessed by the several states, typically 
in cases concerning the application of the Eleventh 
Amendment.20 Human dignity as an independent 
constitutional concept did not enter the Supreme Court lexicon 
until the middle part of the twentieth century. It was not until 
the 1940’s that this new understanding of “dignity” was first 
recognized as a means of vindicating individual rights under 
 
15. Id. 
16. Id.; William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human Dignity, in 
THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY & AMERICAN VALUES 47, 53 
(Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992). 
17. Rao, supra note 13, at 206. 
18. Michael J. Meyer, Introduction to THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: 
HUMAN DIGNITY & AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 16, at 1, 7. 
19. Id.; see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
20. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 149-50 (1908); Cohens v. 
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 
Dall.) 419, 451 (1793) (opinion of Blair, J.). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/9
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the Constitution.21 This change can in part be explained by the 
global response to the Holocaust and other World War II era 
atrocities, resulting in the signing of great international 
agreements such as the United Nations Charter, and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.22 
 
1. Justice Frank Murphy 
 
The individual most responsible for developing human 
dignity as a constitutional value in the twentieth century was 
Justice Frank Murphy.23 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
appointed Justice Murphy to the Court in 1940.24 Prior to his 
appointment, Justice Murphy served as Mayor of Detroit and 
Governor of Michigan, where he developed an accentuated 
sensitivity to the severe problem posed by extreme racism in 
America.25 Deeply affected by what he saw in elected office, 
Justice Murphy’s jurisprudence assumed that the Constitution 
protected the inherent dignity of all persons by virtue of their 
shared humanity.26 While his philosophy was mostly expressed 
in dissent,27 using dignity to inform the Court’s understanding 
of the Constitution set the foundation for its growth during the 
latter half of the twentieth century. 
The particular phrase “human dignity” was first used to 
vindicate individual rights in Justice Murphy’s dissenting 
opinion in Korematsu v. United States.28 Railing against the 
Court’s decision to uphold President Roosevelt’s wartime 
Japanese exclusion policy, Justice Murphy condemned the 
 
21. Rao, supra note 13, at 202. 
22. Goodman, supra note 12, at 750; U.N. Charter preamble; Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
23. Goodman, supra note 12, at 753-54. 
24. In Memory of Mr. Justice Murphy, 340 U.S. v, xii (1951). 
25. Id. at ix–x. 
26. See NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES & TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S 
GREAT SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 184, 248-49 (2010). 
27. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting); 
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 134-35 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting); 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233-35 (1944) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting). 
28. 325 U.S. at 240 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
5
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policy as unalloyed racism.29 The detention of persons based on 
their race, “destroy[ed] the dignity of the individual . . .” and 
was a policy more worthy of the enemy Axis Powers than of the 
United States.30 In one of the Court’s lowest historical 
moments,31 Justice Murphy fully grasped the implications of 
allowing the government’s position to stand unchallenged by 
the Constitution’s clear commands. If one thing distinguished 
the United States from its enemies, Justice Murphy believed it 
was the nation’s constitutional commitment to protect human 
dignity. To him, even the arguable exigencies of war were 
insufficient to vitiate the clear commands of the Constitution 
and the rights that it protects.32 
Justice Murphy also relied on the constitutional 
recognition of human dignity in his dissent in Screws v. United 
States.33 In Screws, the issue was whether local officials, acting 
under the color of Georgia law, could face federal prosecution 
for a racially motivated murder. The defendants in Screws 
arrested an African American male charged with the theft of a 
tire, and proceeded to viciously beat the suspect to death, 
clearly without any due process.34 The Court upheld the 
validity of the prosecution, but reversed the defendants’ 
conviction due to inadequate jury instructions.35 In his dissent, 
Justice Murphy argued that both the prosecution and the 
conviction should have been affirmed, writing: 
 
I dissent. Robert Hall, a Negro citizen, has been 
deprived not only of the right to be tried by a 
 
29. See id. at 239-42. 
30. Id. at 240. 
31. See FELDMAN, supra note 26, at 243; Dawinder S. Sidhu, First 
Korematsu and Now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest Chapter in the Wartime 
Supreme Court’s Disregard for Claims of Discrimination, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 
419, 425 (2010); Nathan Watanabe, Note, Internment, Civil Liberties, and a 
Nation in Crisis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 167, 185 (2003). 
32. Cf. Ex parte Milligan 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120–21 (1886) (“The 
Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in 
war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of 
men, at all times, and under all circumstances.”). 
33. 325 U.S. 91, 134-35 (1945) (Murphy J., dissenting). 
34. See id. 92-93 (majority opinion). 
35. Id. at 107. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/9
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court rather than by ordeal. He has been 
deprived of the right of life itself. That right 
belonged to him not because he was a Negro or a 
member of any particular race or creed. That 
right was his because he was an American 
citizen, because he was a human being. As such, 
he was entitled to all the respect and fair 
treatment that befits the dignity of man, a 
dignity that is recognized and guaranteed by the 
Constitution.36 
 
To Justice Murphy, the issue in Screws transcended the 
technical question of whether federal jurisdiction was proper. 
The crime committed in Screws, a brutal and racially 
motivated murder, implicated the Constitution because Robert 
Hall failed to receive even the smallest degree of due process 
and was instead beaten to death. The local officials, according 
to Justice Murphy, could not have been unaware that their 
actions, taken under color of state law, were violative of the 
due process guarantees enshrined in the Constitution.37 
“Knowledge of a comprehensive law library is unnecessary for 
officers of the law to know that the right to murder individuals 
in the course of their duties is unrecognized in this nation.”38 
That due process is constitutionally compelled, and that it was 
disregarded in the instant case was clear to Justice Murphy 
because of his understanding of the Constitution as a document 
grounded on respect for human dignity. 
Justice Murphy was a tireless advocate for advancing the 
cause of human dignity in American jurisprudence. He 
recognized that many of the basic rights enumerated in the 
Constitution were themselves tools to protect the inherent 
dignity of humanity. However, he was unable to see this 
constitutional theory blossom any further; he died, still on the 
bench, on July 19, 1949.39 Several years would pass before 
another jurist would take up the mantle on behalf of 
 
36. Id. at 134-35 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
37. Id. at 135. 
38. Id. at 136-37. 
39. In Memory of Mr. Justice Murphy, 340 U.S. v, vi (1951). 
7
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constitutional human dignity. 
 
2. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. 
 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., picked up the fight for 
constitutional human dignity where Justice Murphy left off 
and went on to become its leading champion for the remainder 
of the twentieth century. Appointed to the Supreme Court by 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956, Justice Brennan 
served on the Court for over thirty years, becoming perhaps the 
most ardent supporter of the constitutional importance of 
human dignity in the Court’s history, past and present.40 
Discussing the human dignity of the incarcerated, Justice 
Brennan once famously wrote, “even the vilest criminal 
remains a human being possessed of common human dignity.”41 
Justice Brennan thought that the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
the revolution in constitutional jurisprudence that it fostered, 
was the crucial provision that made human dignity a 
constitutionally relevant value, protecting it from depredations 
by state governments on individual rights.42 Justice Brennan 
consistently argued that human dignity was the paramount 
value underlying the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on 
“cruel and unusual punishment.”43 He understood that 
“conceptions of ‘liberty’ have come to recognize the undeniable 
proposition that prisoners and parolees retain some vestiges of 
human dignity.”44 While human dignity and liberty may be 
constitutionally related, this did not make one a mere 
derivative of the other. 
Justice Brennan discussed his conception of human dignity 
and its constitutional dimensions at great length in Furman v. 
 
40. See Stephen J. Wermiel, Essay, Law and Human Dignity: The 
Judicial Soul of Justice Brennan, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 223, 228 (1998). 
41. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 273 (1972) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
42. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The 
Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 535, 536 (1986). 
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
44. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 492 (1977). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/9
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Georgia,45 where the Court held that the death penalty, as then 
applied throughout the United States, was unconstitutional.46 
Despite finding the Eighth Amendment incapable of precise 
definition, Justice Brennan strongly believed that the 
amendment embodies certain values central to American 
government.47 Building on the foundation laid in Trop v. 
Dulles,48 Justice Brennan concluded that a punishment, in this 
case the death penalty, is “cruel or unusual” when “it does not 
comport with human dignity.”49 He concluded that, at the most 
general level, government action does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment where it respects the intrinsic value of the 
individual subjected to punishment.50 
Going much further than the per curiam opinion, Justice 
Brennan applied a four-factor analysis in concluding that the 
death penalty absolutely violated the Eighth Amendment by 
denigrating human dignity. “The primary principle is that a 
punishment must not be so severe as to be degrading to the 
dignity of human beings.”51 The severity of the punishment 
referenced by Justice Brennan does not simply refer to the 
infliction of pain, but also to punishments that “treat members 
of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with 
and discarded.”52 A punishment also violates human dignity 
where the sheer enormity of the punishment imposed on the 
convicted is degrading in and of itself, as was the case in 
Trop.53 Moreover, severe punishment is inconsistent with 
human dignity where it is arbitrarily inflicted by the State.54 
Punishment is arbitrarily inflicted “when, without reason, [the 
State] inflicts upon some people a severe punishment that it 
does not inflict upon others.”55 Human dignity is also affected 
where a punishment is inflicted that is considered 
 
45. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
46. Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
47. Id. at 258. 
48. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
49. Furman, 408 U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 271. 
52. Id. at 272-73. 
53. Id. at 273. 
54. Id. at 274. 
55. Id. 
9
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“unacceptable to contemporary society.”56 A determination that 
a punishment has been rejected by contemporary society, as a 
depredation on human dignity, requires the presence of 
“objective indicators,” such as the contemporary and historical 
use of the punishment being examined, demonstrating a 
society’s current acceptance of that form of punishment.57 
Finally, severe punishment does not comport with human 
dignity where it is “excessive,” that is, “unnecessary.”58 “The 
infliction of a severe punishment by the State cannot comport 
with human dignity when it is nothing more than the pointless 
infliction of suffering.”59 Where a significantly less severe 
punishment is available, a severe punishment is unnecessary 
because it is disproportionate to the offense.60 
In summary, Justice Brennan concluded that a 
punishment violates the Eighth Amendment when it degrades 
human dignity. The four general principles that he elucidated 
in his concurring opinion were aimed at providing “means by 
which a court can determine whether a challenged punishment 
comports with human dignity.”61 Each of the above-mentioned 
factors merely provides a judicial gloss to the term human 
dignity. Justice Brennan’s analysis assumes that human 
dignity was the core value that the Framers wanted to protect 
through the enactment of the Eighth Amendment.62 His 
analysis in Furman used human dignity as the metric to 
determine when punishment crosses the line, but did not alter 
the ability of the government to reduce the liberty of 
individuals convicted of committing a crime. His analysis 
assumed that these individuals possess a lesser degree of 
constitutional liberty than the rest of society. However, Justice 
Brennan was convinced that commission of crime was not a 
blank check for the deprivation of all rights. No commentator 
has seriously challenged this contention; however, there has 
been strong disagreement as to when the line between 
 
56. Id. at 277. 
57. See id. at 278-79. 
58. Id. at 279. 
59. Id. (emphasis added). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 282. 
62. See id. at 270. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/9
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constitutional and unconstitutional punishment has been 
crossed. Justice Brennan’s approach to human dignity 
attempts to create some predictability in drawing this 
constitutional line, while also championing the basic 
understandings of the Framers with regard to the Eighth 
Amendment. 
Justice Brennan also identified human dignity as a 
constitutional value in his majority opinion in Goldberg v. 
Kelly.63 In Goldberg, the Court considered whether welfare 
recipients were entitled to any due process, such as an 
evidentiary hearing, prior to the termination of their welfare 
benefits.64 Conducting evidentiary hearings after the 
termination of welfare benefits was problematic because, 
without those benefits, individuals dependent on welfare were 
generally left without any other means to provide for 
themselves. “[The] need to concentrate upon finding the means 
for daily subsistence, in turn, adversely affects [the welfare 
recipient’s] ability to seek redress from the welfare 
bureaucracy.”65 Finding that due process requires a pre-
deprivation hearing, Justice Brennan upheld what he termed 
to be “the Nation’s basic commitment . . . to foster the dignity 
and well-being of all persons within its borders.”66 Goldberg 
recognized that human dignity is relevant not only where the 
government acts to impinge upon the liberty of its citizens, but 
also where the government positively acts to assist the plight of 
the most unfortunate members of society. 
 
C. The Eighth Amendment & Human Dignity67 
 
The Eight Amendment reads: “Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”68 The Supreme Court first highlighted 
of the obvious connection between the Eighth Amendment and 
 
63. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
64. Id. at 260. 
65. Id. at 264. 
66. Id. at 264–65 (emphasis added). 
67. See also discussion of the Furman case supra Section II.B. 
68. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
11
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to the concept of human dignity in Trop v. Dulles, the 
landmark decision that defined the scope of that amendment.69 
Trop considered whether expatriation of a wartime deserter 
was valid punishment under the Eighth Amendment.70 In 
finding this punishment to be “cruel and unusual,” Chief 
Justice Warren explained, “[t]he basic concept underlying the 
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”71 
In essence, the driving force behind the Eighth Amendment 
was to protect and preserve human dignity from severe 
encroachments by government.72 Moving on from that premise, 
the Court concluded that whether some form of punishment is 
compatible with the Eighth Amendment depends on whether it 
is “within the limits of civilized standards.”73 This fluidic 
concept “draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”74 Justice 
Brennan, in Furman v. Georgia, considered in greater detail 
how contemporary values concerning punishment implicated 
human dignity and related values.75 The protections afforded 
by the Eighth Amendment were made applicable to the states 
by the Court in Robinson v. California, decided in 1962.76 
The prisoners’ rights movement is just one area of Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence where human dignity as a 
constitutional value has played a role in the Court’s decision-
making process. Implicit in the application of the Eighth 
Amendment to prisoners’ conditions of confinement claims is 
the idea that prisoners retain some degree of human dignity 
and are therefore vested with limited constitutional protection. 
While this does not mean that the incarcerated cannot be 
deprived of liberties possessed by law-abiding citizens, it 
recognizes that certain aspects of personal liberty remain after 
 
69. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 100. 
72. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 258, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
73. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100. 
74. Id. at 101 (emphasis added). 
75. See supra notes 55-56. 
76. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/9
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conviction and incarceration.77 Many Supreme Court decisions 
in this field recognize this fact; however, these decisions 
usually balance the rights retained by prisoners against the 
interests of prison administrators in operating the prison 
system safely and efficiently.78 In the past, courts have given 
great deference to the prerogatives of these administrators. In 
Estelle v. Gamble,79 one of the first landmark prisoners’ rights 
cases, the Court held that deliberate indifference to an inmate’s 
serious medical condition constituted “cruel and unusual 
punishment” under the Eighth Amendment. The Court 
recognized that the Eighth Amendment “embodies broad and 
idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, 
and decency . . . .”80 Unfortunately, in the ensuing decades, 
human dignity has not played a prominent role in many of the 
Court’s opinions.81 When references to human dignity appear in 
the pages of the United States Reports, they have mostly been 
confined to concurrences82 and dissents.83 Brown v. Plata 
marks, perhaps, a change in the opposite direction due to its 
strong language embracing the vitality of human dignity as an 
appropriate concern for the courts in vindicating the rights of 
 
77. 1 MUSHLIN, supra note 7, at § 2:2. 
78. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012); 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
79. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
80. Id. at 102 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
81. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 138 (2003) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (“[I]t remains true that the restraints and the punishment which 
a criminal conviction entails do not place the citizen beyond the ethical 
tradition that accords respect to the dignity and intrinsic worth of every 
individual.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 
730, 745 (2002) (“Hope was treated in a way antithetical to human dignity-he 
was hitched to a post for an extended period of time . . . .”) (emphasis added); 
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1992) (quoting the dignity language 
from Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976)); Hutto v. Finney, 437 
U.S. 678, 685 (1978). 
82. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 851 (1994) (Blackmun, J., 
concurring); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 361, 372 (1981) (Brennan & 
Blackmun, JJ., concurring). 
83. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1527 (2012) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 368 (1987) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 579, 592-93 (1979) 
(Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 232-
33 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 597 
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
13
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prisoners in Eighth Amendment cases. 
 
III. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Brown v. Plata84 
 
A. The Decisions Below 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Plata is the 
culmination of over twenty years of litigation brought on behalf 
of a class of Californian prisoners concerning the State’s 
inadequate delivery of health-care and related services.85 The 
plaintiff class in Plata was a consolidation of two separate 
actions brought against the State of California: Coleman v. 
Brown and Brown v. Plata.86 
 
1. Coleman v. Brown 
 
The Coleman plaintiffs, a class of mentally ill prisoners, 
originally brought suit against the State of California in 1995 
claiming that it had failed to provide mental health care 
services required by the Eighth Amendment.87 The district 
court agreed with the plaintiffs, finding that the provision of 
mental health care to inmates in the state fell well below 
constitutionally acceptable levels.88 The district court ordered a 
battery of remedial measures that attempted to ensure greater 
access to mental health care and to improve on-site facilities 
and conditions.89 After years of continued failure, the district 
court appointed a special master to oversee the prison system’s 
rehabilitation.90 Despite such remedial efforts, a continued lack 
of progress caused the plaintiffs to request the empanelling of 
the three-judge panel under the PLRA to consider the issuance 
of a prison population reduction order.91 
 
84. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
85. Id. at 1922. 
86. Id. at 1926. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 1927-28. 
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2. Plata v. Brown 
 
The plaintiffs in the Plata class action originally brought 
suit in 2001, alleging the inadequate provision of medical care 
to California’s inmate population.92 The State stipulated to the 
constitutional violations, seeking to commence the remedial 
phase of the litigation.93 Following several years of remedial 
failure, in 2005 the court placed California’s prison system into 
receivership.94 Less than one year later, the plaintiffs moved to 
empanel a three-judge court because of the lack of any 
appreciable progress at correcting the underlying violations.95 
 
3. Prospective Relief Under the PLRA 
 
Only a three-judge panel may issue a prison population 
reduction order under the PLRA.96 This expresses Congress’s 
desire that such orders be granted sparingly and only after 
much deliberation. To convene a three-judge panel under the 
PLRA, a plaintiff must show that the originating court 
previously issued “an order for less intrusive relief that has 
failed to remedy the deprivation . . .” of a federal right,97 and 
that “the defendant has had a reasonable [opportunity] to 
comply with the previous court orders.”98 Once a three-judge 
panel has been convened, a prison population reduction order 
may be granted if the plaintiffs show, with clear and convincing 
evidence, that: (1) that overcrowding is the primary cause of 
the constitutional violation;99 (2) that no other relief will be 
able to remedy this violation;100 (3) that the relief be narrowly 
drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the 
constitutional violation, and be accomplished through the least 
 
92. Id. at 1926. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 1926-27. 
95. Id. at 1927-28. 
96. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(B) (2006). 
97. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i). 
98. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(ii). 
99. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i). 
100. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(ii). 
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intrusive means;101 and finally (4) that the court “give 
substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety . . . 
caused by the relief.”102 
 
4. The Three-Judge Panel’s Decision 
 
The three-judge panel, following a lengthy discovery 
process and trial, granted the plaintiffs’ request for a prison 
population reduction order. The court issued extensive factual 
findings detailing the horrific conditions experienced by 
plaintiffs’ class as a result of the overcrowded nature of the 
California prison system.103 For instance, suicidal inmates were 
placed in holding cells no better than cages for hours on end, 
with many committing suicide at a rate almost eighty percent 
higher than the national average.104 Inmates suffering from 
physical aliments were subjected to similarly deplorable 
conditions, leading the court to find that the amount of 
preventable deaths in the prison system “was extremely 
high.”105 Ultimately, the three-judge panel concluded that a 
reduction in the prison population to 137.5 % of capacity within 
two years was permissible under the PLRA and would remedy 
the system’s constitutional deficiencies, leaving the specifics on 
how to achieve that goal to the State’s discretion.106 
 
B. The Supreme Court Decides 
 
On May 23, 2011, the Supreme Court affirmed the three-
judge panel’s decision to issue a prison population reduction 
order. In a five to four decision,107 Justice Kennedy found that 
the panel was properly convened under the PLRA, and that its 
 
101. Id. § 3626(a)(1)(A). 
102. Id. 
103. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011). 
104. Id. at 1924. 
105. Id. at 1925 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
106. Id. at 1928. 
107. Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan 
comprised the Court’s majority affirming the lower court order, whilst Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito voted to reverse. Id. 
at 1921. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/9
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decision to grant the prison population reduction order was 
properly granted.108 The Court’s opinion was phrased in very 
narrow terms, giving the State significant discretion in 
determining how best to reach the 137.5% population cap 
ordered by the three-judge panel. 
Beginning the Court’s discussion is language that strongly 
affirms the role of the federal courts in upholding the 
constitutional rights of all persons, including prisoners.109 The 
Court prominently relied on how the inherent human dignity of 
prisoners compelled the Court’s result. Justice Kennedy wrote: 
 
As a consequence of their own actions, prisoners 
may be deprived of rights that are fundamental 
to liberty. Yet the law and the Constitution 
demand recognition of certain other rights. 
Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity 
inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity 
animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment.110 
 
The Court emphasizes that when individuals are 
incarcerated they are deprived of the ability to provide for 
themselves the most basic of life’s necessities. For instance, 
prisoners depend on the State to provide them with adequate 
food and medical care.111 A failure to provide inmates with 
these necessities “may actually produce physical torture or a 
lingering death.”112 Where the government has neglected its 
duties, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, it is up to the 
judiciary to ensure that a remedy is provided. While courts 
must give some amount of deference to the concerns of prison 
administrators, because of their expertise in housing large 
numbers of dangerous convicts and legitimate interest in 
criminal punishment, the courts cannot permit ongoing 
constitutional violations “simply because a remedy would 
 
108. Id. at 1923. 
109. Id. at 1928–29. 
110. Id. at 1928 (emphasis added). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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involve intrusion into the realm of prison administration.”113 
The Court’s strong language is crucial to understanding its 
holding within the context of prisoners’ rights law. Historically, 
courts have been cautious to act with any vigor where inmates 
allege constitutional violations concerning conditions of 
confinement.114 While the prisoners’ rights movements of the 
latter twentieth century gradually called into doubt the notion 
that prisoners lose all their liberties upon incarceration,115 
Justice Kennedy’s language in this section of the Court’s 
opinion is an important step forward in how the federal 
judiciary conceives of its role in protecting these rights. The 
Court’s opinion affirms the judiciary’s power to correct 
constitutional violations in the prison context, and directly 
states that the courts must not shirk this responsibility when 
doing so is necessary despite the protests of prison officials.116 
The Court then considered whether the three-judge panel 
was properly convened under the PLRA. The plaintiffs were 
required to show that the lower court had previously issued an 
order for a less intrusive remedy that failed to rectify the 
violation of a federal constitutional right, and that the 
defendant had been given an appropriate amount of time to 
comply with the lower court’s previous orders.117 Both of these 
requirements were met.118 As to the first requirement, the 
record was replete with examples of past court orders of a less 
intrusive nature than a population reduction order.119 
Remedial efforts had been ongoing for over twelve years to no 
avail for the Coleman class action plaintiffs, and for nearly five 
years for the Plata class action plaintiffs at the time the three-
 
113. Id. at 1929. 
114. 1 MUSHLIN, supra note 7, at §§ 1:3, 2:4 (discussing the 19th-20th 
Century “hands-off” doctrine and the highly deferential test announced in 
Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), applied in many prisoners’ rights cases); 
see also Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (giving 
great deference to the needs of prison administrators in upholding strip 
search of misdemeanor arrestee). 
115. 1 MUSHLIN, supra note 7, at § 1:4. 
116. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1929. 
117. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii) (2006). 
118. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1930–31. 
119. Id. 
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judge panel convened.120 The more difficult question before the 
Court was whether the State had been given sufficient time to 
comply with these past remedial efforts, especially in light of 
the recent appointment of a receiver in the Plata case only one 
year earlier.121 The Court declined to read this section of the 
PLRA literally as advocated by California.122 To do otherwise 
would require that for a period of time no remedial efforts be 
undertaken, prolonging the period of the court’s involvement, 
anathema to the judiciary’s exercise of equitable jurisdiction.123 
While each new remedial order “must be given a reasonable 
time to succeed, . . . [this] must be assessed in light of the 
entire history of the court’s remedial efforts.”124 
Having answered the question of whether the three-judge 
panel was properly convened, the Court moved on and 
determined that the lower court had not erred in finding that 
“crowding [was] the primary cause of the violation of a Federal 
right.”125 In making this determination, the Court was required 
to give deference to the factual findings of the three-judge 
court.126 The record below clearly demonstrated to the Court 
that the overcrowding of California’s prisons had a drastic 
impact on the provision of medical care.127 Justice Kennedy 
pointed out that the vacancy rates for key medical personnel 
ranged from twenty percent for surgeons, to over fifty percent 
for psychiatrists.128 Furthermore, even if an overwhelming 
majority of those positions could be have been filled with 
proficient medical professionals, the State’s prisons still lacked 
the necessary space for the additional personnel to deliver 
adequate care to the prisoner population.129 The overcrowding 
was also the primary cause of the significant delays in 
 
120. Id. at 1930. 
121. Id. at 1931. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i) (2006). 
126. Plata, 131 U.S. at 1932 (citing Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 
U.S. 225, 233 (1991)). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 1933. 
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treatment to both mentally ill and physically ill inmates.130 In 
the most extreme cases, these delays in treatment gave sick 
inmates sufficient time to commit suicide when this result may 
have been entirely preventable.131 While overcrowding took a 
toll on the delivery of medical care, it also fostered unsafe and 
unsanitary conditions creating more sickness to be treated, 
compounding the problems of delivery.132 In one instance, 
prison staff did not learn about the preventable death of an 
inmate, who had been assaulted, until several hours 
afterwards, because of severe overcrowding.133 In another case, 
two inmates were given the opportunity to hang themselves 
after they had been placed in cells containing noose attachment 
points that could have easily been removed.134 The attachment 
points had not been removed because prison officials had no 
place to put the inmates while the repair was being made.135 
Further, increased violence in overcrowded prisons has 
required administrators to increasingly rely on lockdowns to 
maintain order.136 During these lockdowns prisoners must 
either be escorted to the medical facilities or the medical 
personnel must be brought to the prisoners.137 This has 
increased the strain placed on the prison medical system, and 
has resulted in the suspension of programming specifically 
designed to treat mentally ill prisoners.138 
The Court also rejected the contention raised by the 
defendants, that the three-judge panel failed to allow enough 
time for adequate discovery prior to trial and that accordingly, 
the plaintiff presented insufficient evidence about current 
prison conditions.139 The three-judge panel extensively relied 
upon expert testimony of near-current prison conditions, and 
maintained that “[o]rderly trial management may require 
 
130. See id. 
131. Id. at n.6. 
132. Id. at 1933. 
133. Id. at 1933-34. 
134. Id. at 1934. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 1935. 
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discovery deadlines . . . .”140 This result was further compelled 
by the fact that the three-judge panel’s decision was limited to 
granting a remedy rather than a re-litigation of the 
constitutional violations alleged.141 Discovery was 
appropriately limited with these goals in mind. 
Although the plaintiffs admitted that the violation of their 
constitutional rights was caused by other factors in addition to 
overcrowding, such an admission did not serve to invalidate the 
three-judge panel’s conclusion that the overcrowding was the 
primary cause of these violations.142 To find that overcrowding 
was the primary cause of the violation, it must be found that 
overcrowding was “the foremost, chief, or principal cause of the 
violation.”143 General canons of statutory interpretation 
suggest that if Congress intended that overcrowding be the 
only cause of the violation, it would have expressly said so 
when the PLRA was enacted into law.144 The Court stressed 
that the PLRA should not be construed so as to place strictures 
on a federal court’s power to fabricate “practical remedies when 
confronted with complex and intractable constitutional 
violations.”145 
The Court next considered whether the three-judge panel 
appropriately found, by clear and convincing evidence, that “no 
other relief will remedy the violation . . .”146 of the protected 
right.147 The Court considered, and rejected the argument of 
the State that it could adequately remedy the ongoing 
constitutional violations through the construction of new 
facilities, out-of-state transfers of prisoners, increased hiring of 
medical personnel, continued adherence to the work of the 
special master and receiver, or a combination of these four 
remedies.148 The State’s proposal to remedy the constitutional 
violations by increasing out-of-state prison transfers was 
 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 1936. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 1937. 
146. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(ii) (2006). 
147. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1937. 
148. Id. 
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inadequate because such transfers are considered a population 
reduction by the PLRA.149 Even if California could transfer a 
sufficient number of prisoners out-of-state to alleviate the 
overcrowding, the remedy, a form of population reduction, 
would not technically be considered a less restrictive 
alternative to the three-judge panel’s order.150 The Court also 
rejected the State’s argument that it can build its way out of 
the overcrowding problem, noting California’s current fiscal 
crisis.151 The State’s inability to construct new medical facilities 
also undercuts the State’s argument that a remedy could be 
achieved through hiring additional personnel. Even if a 
sufficient number of medical personnel were hired, there would 
still be insufficient space in which the additional personnel 
could work.152 
The Court also rejected the argument that the special 
master in Coleman and the receiver in Plata should be given 
more time to continue their efforts at remedying the 
inadequacies inherent in the prison system’s medical care 
delivery.153 Reports filed by the receiver and special master 
essentially stated that continued efforts on their part would fail 
to correct the system unless something was done to alleviate 
the problem posed by the overcrowding.154 The Court also found 
the State’s final argument, that all of the aforementioned 
remedies combined could remedy the ongoing constitutional 
violations, to be unpersuasive. Absent a population reduction, 
all of the State’s solutions ultimately required California to 
expend large sums of money, a fiscal impossibility at the 
current time.155 Furthermore, the State’s attempts to remedy 
this situation had been ongoing for nearly two decades, 
suggesting that the current “solutions” were insufficient to 
solve the problem.156 
Under the PLRA prospective relief must be narrowly 
 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 1938. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 1938-39. 
155. Id. at 1939. 
156. Id. 
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drawn, extend no further than is necessary to alleviate the 
violation, and must be the least intrusive means necessary to 
remedy the violation of a federal right.157 In making this 
determination, courts are required to “give substantial weight 
to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a 
criminal justice system.”158 The State argued that the collateral 
consequences of the prisoner release order is evidence that the 
remedy is not narrowly tailored, and that as a result, its sweep 
is far too broad.159 An order is not excessively broad simply 
because it has effects that will be felt beyond the plaintiffs’ 
class. For a remedy’s scope to be narrowly tailored, it must be 
proportional to the violation that it purports to correct.160 
Simply put, collateral effects that emanate from the correction 
of a constitutional violation do not, alone, render a remedy 
inappropriate under the PLRA.161 Collateral effects violate the 
narrowly tailored requirement only when the courts seek to 
alter prison conditions outside of the scope of the constitutional 
violation alleged by the plaintiffs.162 Justice Kennedy pointed 
out that “[e]ven prisoners with no present physical or mental 
illness may become afflicted, and all prisoners in California are 
at risk so long as the State continues to provide inadequate 
care.”163 The Court noted the associated dangers in releasing 
prisoners only within the plaintiff class, especially with regards 
to the high recidivism rates among the mentally ill.164 The 
overcrowding problem would not be solved as those prisoners 
would inevitably find themselves back in prison before too long, 
solving the overcrowding problem not one bit. Releasing those 
individuals who are less likely to commit “fresh” crimes would 
go a long way to truly relieve the pressure on the prison 
medical care system caused by overcrowding. Importantly, the 
three-judge panel’s prisoner release order gives: 
 
 
157. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) (2006). 
158. Id. 
159. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1939. 
160. Id. at 1939-40. 
161. Id. at 1940 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
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[T]he State substantial flexibility to determine 
who should be released. If the State truly 
believes that a release order limited to sick and 
mentally ill inmates would be preferable to the 
order entered by the three-judge court, the State 
can move the three-judge court for modification 
of the order on that basis.165 
 
The lower court’s remedy was not overbroad because it 
targeted the entire California prison system instead of each 
individual prison facility. It is undisputed that the 
constitutional violations are systemic in nature.166 This 
approach is logical because focusing on the entirety of the state 
prison system allows California greater discretion in how it 
achieves the population numbers ordered by the lower court.167 
Because of the systemic nature of this approach, each prison 
facility need not reach a population of 137.5 % of maximum 
capacity.168 Some of the State’s prison populations may be well 
in excess of that limit, so long as other facilities are able to fall 
below that number, thus reducing the population levels in the 
entire system to the parameters set out by the lower court’s 
order.169 This systemic approach gives the State flexibility in 
how it decides to comply with the three-judge panel’s order, 
allowing it to take into account the very real differences 
between many of the State’s prison facilities. For instance, the 
State may be able to shift prisoners to facilities that are better 
able to handle overcrowding without causing further 
constitutional violations.170 Importantly, the lower court’s order 
leaves those decisions up to the State, and not unelected, life-
tenured federal judges.171 The Court, in addition to stressing 
the deference given to the State by the lower court’s order, also 
indicated that the State is free to move the three-judge panel 
 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 1940-41. 
168. Id. at 1941. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
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for modification of the remedial order.172 Moving the three-
judge panel to modify the remedial order is entitled to serious 
consideration as “time and experience . . . reveal targeted and 
effective remedies that will end the constitutional violations 
even without a significant decrease in the general prison 
population.”173 
Next the Court considered whether the three-judge panel 
gave “substantial weight” to the effects of a prisoner release 
order on public safety in accordance with the requirements of 
the PLRA.174 The PLRA’s language does not require the court 
to ensure that there be no adverse effects resulting from a 
release order, only that “substantial weight” be given to 
possible detrimental outcomes in deciding to order a population 
reduction. The lower court gave significant attention to the 
issue of public safety; ten days of trial were allocated to this 
issue, and the court frequently referred to the problem of public 
safety in its final opinion.175 Weighing these possible outcomes, 
it was acceptable for the panel to rely on expert testimony from 
prison administrators throughout the country.176 When making 
difficult factual findings, reliance on informed expert testimony 
is indispensable for the court to fashion injunctive relief 
appropriate to remedy constitutional violations. The experts 
that testified before the three-judge panel “testified on the 
basis of empirical evidence and extensive experience in the 
field of prison administration.”177 Several points were salient to 
the Court’s conclusion that the three-judge panel fulfilled its 
statutory goal in that regard. Many of the experts testified that 
prison populations can be reduced in a manner that does not 
increase crime, but may actually have the effect of promoting 
and improving the public safety.178 Additionally, the experts 
testified about statistical evidence demonstrating that prison 
 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2006). The PLRA requires that the 
court give “substantial weight” to possible detrimental outcomes when 
deciding to order a population reduction. Id. A court is not required to ensure 
no adverse effects will result from a release order. 
175. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1941. 
176. Id. at 1942. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
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populations have been lowered in other jurisdictions without 
also undermining the public safety.179 Other methods available 
to prison administrators, like the use of good-time credits to 
release prisoners less likely to be recidivist, and the diversion 
of low-risk offenders to community programs also serves to 
reduce overcrowding, while minimally affecting public safety.180 
Once again, the State has significant discretion in deciding how 
best to comply with the three-judge panel’s order. “The decision 
to leave details of implementation to the State’s discretion 
protect[s] public safety by leaving sensitive policy decisions to 
responsible and competent state officials.”181 
Penultimately, the Court considered whether the three-
judge panel had erred in concluding that California prison 
population should be reduced to 137.5% of capacity in order to 
bring the system into compliance with the Constitution.182 
Again, the Court considered whether the lower court gave 
substantial weight to public safety concerns and whether the 
remedy was narrowly tailored to the constitutional violation.183 
The narrow tailoring requirement demands that the court 
order the release only of the fewest prisoners necessary to 
remedy the constitutional violation. The lower court did not 
commit clear error by capping the prison population at 137.5%; 
in fact the Court found evidence that even a more drastic 
remedy would have been appropriate.184 Contrary to the State’s 
argument, the Court found no evidence that the experts who 
testified before the lower court improperly expressed their own 
policy preferences instead of the narrowest cure for the ongoing 
constitutional violations.185 The lower court’s decision was 
supported by evidence that the problems posed by 
overcrowding could be cured with a population cap of anywhere 
between 130 % and 145 % of prison capacity.186 The lower court 
did not act improperly by “splitting the difference,” especially 
 
179. Id. at 1942-43. 
180. Id. at 1943. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 1944. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 1945. 
185. Id. at 1944-45. 
186. Id. at 1945. 
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since it had given both sides a chance to present their views on 
the issue and where scientific precision may be impossible to 
achieve.187 
Finally, the Court considered whether the three-judge 
panel acted properly by ordering the State to reduce its prison 
population to 137.5 % of design capacity within a two-year time 
span.188 This compliance period would not commence until after 
the Court’s decision was announced, meaning that the State 
had, up until this time, been given a two-year head start.189 In 
that time, the State had reduced the prison population by some 
nine thousand inmates, and “[began] to implement measures to 
shift ‘thousands’ of additional prisoners to county facilities.”190 
However, if the State requests an extension, the three-judge 
panel should “remain open to a showing or demonstration by 
either party that the injunction should be altered . . . .”191 The 
State has thus far failed to move the three-judge panel to 
extend the deadline. The Court baldly suggested that if the 
State moved to extend the deadline, that request should be 
granted.192 
 
IV. The Future of Human Dignity & the Constitution? 
 
A. In General 
 
The importance of Plata on prisoners’ rights law will 
become clear only if and when its underlying logic is applied in 
the future. The Court affirmed not just the power of the federal 
courts to enforce constitutional rights of prisoners, but also 
held, using strong and deliberate language, that prisoners’ 
human dignity animates the rights afforded them by the 
Eighth Amendment. Taken together, these two concepts 
encourage the courts to take a more active role in vindicating 
the constitutional rights of the imprisoned. In Plata, by 
 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 1945-46. 
189. Id. at 1946. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. at 1946-47. 
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arguing that human dignity animates the Eighth Amendment 
protections afforded prisoners, the Court suggests that the 
judiciary cannot hide behind deference to the decisions of 
prison administrators and decline to enforce the rights of 
prisoners where such egregious violations of constitutional 
rights persist.193 However, one must be careful in overstating 
the importance of this rule. The magnitude of the 
constitutional violations at issue in Plata is quite rare. Justice 
Kennedy might simply be marking out the boundaries; where 
the clear and continuous violations of the Eighth Amendment 
mandate the imposition of a drastic remedy.  In that case, 
Plata serves merely as an outlier. 
The Court’s holding is all the more interesting in light of 
the general scholarly consensus that the PLRA has acted to 
restrict the prisoners’ access to the legal system.194 This 
restriction would prevent prisoners from preserving their 
constitutional rights.195 However, at the very least the Plata 
decision is a sign that the judiciary will not use the PLRA to 
intentionally frustrate the ability of prisoners to access the 
legal system, which is in essence the approach urged by Justice 
Scalia in his dissent: 
 
There comes before us, now and then, a case 
whose proper outcome is so clearly indicated by 
tradition and common sense, that its decision 
ought to shape the law, rather than vice versa. 
One would think that, before allowing the decree 
of a federal district court to release 46,000 
 
193. Id. at 1929. 
194. See generally Michael B. Mushlin, Unlocking the Courthouse Door: 
Removing the Barrier of the PLRA’s Physical Injury Requirement to Permit 
Meaningful Judicial Oversight of Abuses in Supermax Prisons and Isolation 
Units, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 268 (2012) (discussing how the PLRA’s 
requirement permitting prisoners to bring claims of mental or emotional 
injury only if accompanied by some non-de minimis physical injury has 
severely restricted prisoners’ access to the courts specifically erecting a 
barrier between the Constitution and prisoners held in solitary confinement); 
Margo Schlanger, Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Jails and Prisons: 
The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 139 (2008); Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 
passim (2003). 
195. See sources cited supra note 194. 
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convicted felons, this Court would bend every 
effort to read the law in such a way as to avoid 
that outrageous result.196 
 
Despite the fears of judicial activism espoused by the 
dissenting justices,197 the Court’s opinion is a leading example 
of “judicial restraint.” The majority opinion tightly applies the 
various applicable sections of the PLRA, and gives great 
deference to the lower court’s findings of fact. Additionally, the 
prisoner release order itself gives discretion to state officials in 
determining the precise measures by which the State’s prisoner 
population will be reduced.198 
Remedying violations of constitutional rights, especially 
those of unpopular minority groups, has been one of the most 
important roles of the federal courts since World War II. 
Respect for human dignity should play a part in this calculus, 
as it is integral to any understanding of the Eighth 
Amendment. Plata recognizes that violations of human dignity 
provide clear examples of instances where the courts must act 
to effectuate constitutional guarantees. The problem with using 
human dignity as a tool of constitutional interpretation results 
from the ambiguity of the term itself, and therefore, the 
indefiniteness of determining when government action crosses 
that purported line. It may be that the courts, possibly like in 
Plata, are reduced to analyzing these questions in a manner 
similar to Justice Potter Stewart’s famous “I know it when I 
see it” retort in Jacobellis v. Ohio.199 
 
B. Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders: An About-Face 
on Human Dignity? 
 
One case decided in 2012, Florence v. Board of Chosen 
Freeholders,200 raises significant questions about the breadth of 
the Plata decision, particularly the relevance of human dignity 
 
196. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1950 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
197. See id. at 1950, 1959 (Scalia & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
198. Id. at 1920 (majority opinion). 
199. 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
200. 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012). 
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to constitutional analysis. The Court once again pays 
significant deference to the concerns of prison administrators 
allowing for the proliferation of troublesome practices at the 
expense of prisoners.201 Most unsettling is that Justice 
Kennedy is the author of the Court’s opinion in Florence.202 At 
issue in Florence was whether, consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment, prison officials could subject a detainee 
introduced into the general prison population to a visual strip 
search.203 Albert Florence had been arrested seven years prior 
to the events at issue before the Court for fleeing from the 
police. He plead to the lesser of the offenses charged and was 
sentenced to pay a fine, due in monthly installments.204 
Florence fell behind on these payments, and a bench warrant 
for his arrest was issued after he failed to make an appearance 
at an enforcement hearing. He caught up on his payments, but 
the bench warrant was somehow never removed from the police 
computer system.205 In 2005, Florence was pulled over by the 
police while driving in Burlington County with his wife. The 
police proceeded to arrest Florence because of the outstanding 
bench warrant that had never been removed from the computer 
system. Florence was detained at two separate detention 
facilities where he was subject to a visual “strip search” prior to 
being introduced to the general prison population.206 The 
search procedures utilized by each detention center required 
detainees to remove all of their clothing while officers would 
check for contraband, wounds, and gang-related body marks. 
 
201. See id. In fact, Justice Kennedy begins his opinion with a paean to 
the judicial deference due institutional administrators: “Correctional officials 
have a legitimate interest, indeed a responsibility, to ensure that jails are not 
made less secure by reason of what new detainees may carry in on their 
bodies.” Id. at 1513. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 1514. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. The Court was uncomfortable with using the term “strip search” 
to describe the search procedure endured by Florence because of its relative 
imprecision. The Court noted that the term could be applied to a broad array 
of search procedures, including physical searches of detainees’ bodies. Query 
whether the Court’s discomfort with using the term “strip search” to describe 
the treatment received by Florence aided its ultimate decision to defer to 
prison administrators. See id. at 1515. 
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Officers would also, without touching, peruse detainees’ 
mouths and genital areas. These procedures applied to every 
individual processed by the detention centers.207 
Florence argued that the mandatory strip search 
procedures were unconstitutional as applied to individuals 
arrested for minor offenses. Strip searches of this nature could 
be utilized only if officials had reasonable suspicion that a 
detainee was concealing contraband.208 The district court 
agreed with Florence and found the challenged strip search 
policy unconstitutional. The Third Circuit reversed, finding 
that the challenged search procedures properly balanced the 
privacy interests of the detainees with the security needs of the 
detention centers.209 
Finding the strip search procedures employed against 
Florence constitutionally permissible, the Court anchored its 
analysis in a sympathetic discussion of the tough decisions 
faced by prison administrators and the high degree of deference 
that courts should give to those decisions.210 Acknowledging 
that the constitutionality of a particular search method must 
be analyzed by balancing the State’s need for search against its 
invasion into personal privacy,211 much of the Court’s opinion 
focused on the threats to prison security that would ensue if 
prison officials were unable to conduct visual strip searches, 
even on individuals detained for petty offenses.212 An individual 
may be arrested for petty offenses without a warrant by virtue 
of the Court’s decision in Atwater v. Lago Vista.213 The parade 
of horribles trotted out by the majority in this regard included 
gang violence, contagious diseases, and contraband-induced 
violence.214 The Court even went out of its way to suggest that 
individuals arrested for petty offenses may in some cases turn 
 
207. Id. at 1514 
208. Id. at 1515. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 1515 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85, 89 (1987)). 
Indeed, the Court’s analysis opens by stating: “The difficulties of operating a 
detention center must not be underestimated by the courts.” Id. 
211. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). 
212. See Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1518-22. 
213. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
214. See Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1518-20. 
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out to be some of the most dangerous criminals imaginable, 
and that this is a reasonable concern for prison officials to 
consider when crafting a detainee search policy.215 Finally, the 
Court’s opinion dwelled upon the general impracticability of 
administering the “reasonable suspicion” approach favored by 
the plaintiff in Florence. Prison administrators have a strong 
interest in possessing easily administrable rules that a 
“reasonable suspicion” test would greatly impair.216 This 
evidence led Justice Kennedy to conclude in Florence that 
submitting all individuals entering detention facilities, 
regardless of the charged offense, to a strip search struck “a 
reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the needs of 
the [prison] institutions.”217 The evidence suggested to the 
Court that the needs of prison administrators outweighed 
prisoners’ privacy interests despite the affront to dignity 
engendered by invasive strip searches policies. 
Florence clearly affects how one must view Plata’s broader 
impact on prisoners’ rights issues and the larger meaning of 
human dignity as a constitutional value. The Court in Plata 
was quick to begin its discussion of the legal issues by 
highlighting the inherent rights and liberties retained by 
prisoners, despite their lawful imprisonment.218 In contrast, 
Florence focuses almost entirely on the deference that courts 
must give to prison administrators, highlighting the dangers 
that undermine an orderly prison system.219 Furthermore, the 
Court’s opinion is replete with language espousing strong 
judicial deference to the concerns of prison administrators.220 
 
215. Id. at 1520. The Court also suggested that persons arrested for 
minor offenses may be susceptible to coercion by others to smuggle 
contraband into prison, and that the effect of treating low level offenders 
differently from individuals who have committed more serious offenses would 
lead to a greater amount of contraband entering the detention center. Id. at 
1521. 
216. Id. at 1522. 
217. Id. at 1523. 
218. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011). 
219. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1515. 
220. Some examples of the Court’s language are instructive. The opinion 
begins as follows: “Correctional officials have a legitimate interest, indeed a 
responsibility, to ensure that jails are not made less secure by reason of what 
new detainees may carry in on their bodies.” Id. at 1513. “Maintaining safety 
and order at these institutions requires the expertise of correctional officials 
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Most surprising is Justice Kennedy’s insinuation that strip 
searches of low-level offenders are always constitutionally 
permissible. Yet, this sweeping rule in Florence is at odds with 
the concerns for human dignity held by Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion in Plata. That such an insinuation is present in 
Florence is made clear by the separate concurring opinions 
written by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.221 It 
remained Justice Breyer’s responsibility in his dissenting 
opinion to remind the Court of the important dignity interests 
retained by prisoners and of the affront to that dignity caused 
by an invasive strip search policy, such as the one in 
Florence.222 Thus human dignity as a constitutional value 
clearly did not play as prominent a role in the Florence decision 
as it had in Plata only one year earlier. This is troubling 
because it casts doubt on the durability of the concept of 
human dignity as a readily discernible constitutional value, 
particularly when the same Justice authors the contrasting 
opinions. Justice Kennedy’s decision to elide any discussion of 
human dignity in Florence suggests that the concept of human 
dignity may be one of style rather than of substance. If the 
phrase “human dignity” is used only as a means to justify 
opinions that vindicate individual rights rather than as a 
normative principle that compels the result in such a case, then 
the concept runs the risk of becoming a superfluous turn of 
phrase devoid of any concrete legal meaning. 
Despite the seemingly huge substantive disparities that 
exist between Plata and Florence, the cases may be 
reconcilable. The alleged constitutional violations at issue in 
 
who must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the 
problems they face.” Id. at 1515. “People detained for minor offenses can turn 
out to be the most devious and dangerous criminals . . . . Reasonable 
correctional officials could conclude these uncertainties mean they must 
conduct the same thorough search of everyone who will be admitted to their 
facilities.” Id. at 1520. 
221. Id. at 1523-24 (Roberts, C.J. & Alito, J., concurring). “The Court 
makes a persuasive case for the general applicability of the rule it announces. 
The Court is nonetheless wise to leave open the possibility of exceptions . . . 
.”Id. at 1523 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
222. Id. at 1525 (Breyer, J., dissenting). “Those confined in prison retain 
basic constitutional rights . . . . I doubt that we seriously disagree about the 
nature of the strip search or about how the serious affront to human dignity 
and to individual privacy that it presents.” Id. at 1525, 1527. 
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each case are arguably of different magnitude. In Plata, the 
Court considered the appropriateness of remedial efforts 
pertaining to long-standing and systemic constitutional 
violations that directly impacted the immediate health and 
safety of thousands of inmates held in California’s prisons.223 In 
Florence, the alleged violation occurred during a close visual 
inspection of an arrestee’s naked body by jail officials.224 Strip 
searches implicate important privacy interests of prisoners, 
however, for Justice Kennedy, the invasion of privacy in 
Florence did not rise to an affront to human dignity in the same 
way that it had in Plata. 
Judicial policies of deference may also explain the 
similarity of results in both cases. In Plata the Court was 
reviewing the decision of a lower court as to the 
appropriateness of a particular remedial measure. Because of 
the lower court’s proximity to the factual determinations, the 
Supreme Court was obliged to give deference to its findings of 
fact so long as the lower court did not make a “mistake.”225 In 
Florence the Court felt compelled to give deference to the 
concerns of administrators unless their reasoning was found to 
be unreasonable when compared to the privacy interests of the 
detainees.226 Finally, the Court in Plata was not tasked with 
determining whether the California medical care delivery 
system was constitutionally deficient; the Court needed to 
decide only the propriety of the remedy granted by the three-
judge court.227 In contrast, the Court in Florence considered the 
constitutionality of a prison strip search policy on the merits 
rather than simply assuming that a constitutional claim was 
valid in the first place. While the Plata Court discussed the 
underlying factual claims that gave rise to the constitutional 
challenge, it was not asked to specifically weigh in on the 
 
223. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1922. 
224. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1514. 
225. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1929-30. “The three-judge court’s findings of 
fact may be reversed only if this Court is left with a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. at 1930 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
226. Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1517. 
227. See Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1926. “The [three-judge] court reasoned that 
its decision was limited to the issue of remedy and that the merits of the 
constitutional violation had already been determined.” Id. at 1935. 
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/9
  
2013] BROWN V. PLATA: THE STRUGGLE 1289 
applicability of the Eighth Amendment in the same way that it 
discussed the Fourth Amendment in Florence. 
Both Florence and Plata demonstrate the difficulty that 
inheres in using human dignity to understand the substantive 
protections of the constitution. What is the real difference 
between the violations at issue in either case? There is no easy 
way to make these distinctions. This legal analysis is 
unsatisfying, leaving us without any ability to distinguish 
between those cases where human dignity will be implicated, 
and those where it will not. Human dignity as a constitutional 
value should not remain “off the table” until the point when we 
can craft a test for readily determining when, and if, there is a 
constitutional violation. While Plata seems to open a door for 
more active judicial involvement in prisoners’ rights cases, 
Florence certainly inspires some level of caution. Plata perhaps 
stands as an example of the extreme; the facts presented such 
an egregious situation that the Court had to say to prison 
administrators that enough was enough. Despite cases like 
Florence, it is not likely that the Court will completely ignore 
human dignity considerations when deciding prisoners’ rights 
cases. Human dignity’s impact on such decisions will merely be 
limited to those cases that present the most egregious 
examples of prisoner treatment, cases very much akin to those 
which “shock the conscience” of the judiciary in cases decided 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.228 Perhaps what makes the 
Court’s decision in Florence so unsettling is that instead of 
declaring that the strip search policy undermined the plaintiff’s 
human dignity, the Court simply ignored the implications of 
that policy on human dignity altogether. If the Court had 
couched its argument in favor of upholding the strip search 
policy, by stating that the policy did not denigrate the 
plaintiff’s dignity, the court would at least provide some 
content to that principal in delineating what level of conduct 
improperly affect an individual’s human dignity. By failing to 
mention human dignity altogether, the court did nothing the 
assist lower courts, and the nation, in determining what it 
means when it uses that phrase. Human dignity, as a value 
embodied by the Constitution, is more than a nebulous concept, 
 
228. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
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as decisions like Plata make clear, but the Court needs to 
consistently apply the concept, rather than mention it only 
where it is convenient to do so. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Human dignity, a constitutional principle that is important 
to the protection and vindication of individual rights, is 
conceptually still very much in its intellectual infancy. Human 
dignity is a principal that has been increasingly utilized by the 
Court over the past fifty years, and has been legitimized at a 
breakneck pace. The Plata decision sets a high-water mark for 
the application of human dignity as an underlying 
constitutional value in the field of prisoners’ rights. Plata 
suggests that the Court will be willing to intervene when it 
finds that the constitutional rights of an exceedingly unpopular 
minority have been violated. Yet, this is in tension with the 
usual judicial proclivity towards deference to prison 
administrators. However momentous the decision in Plata, one 
must be careful in prognosticating too far into the future when 
it comes to the Supreme Court in this field of constitutional 
law. In less than a year after Plata, the Court’s decision in 
Florence, also written by Justice Kennedy, should make any 
optimist pause before overestimating the magnitude of 
importance of human dignity as a value in constitutional 
interpretation. The Court has indicated that it will still defer, 
in many cases, to the concerns expressed by prison 
administrators.  
Whether the forceful language concerning human dignity 
used by the majority in Plata shall be reserved to only those 
cases that present the most egregious examples of prisoner 
abuse remains to be seen. Even if human dignity has its 
greatest constitutional application only where conduct shocks 
the judicial conscience, this more consistent approach will 
allow for the future development and legal solidity of a value 
that animates the fundamental guarantees of the Constitution. 
The “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society”229 require us to constantly strive to 
 
229. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958). 
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reevaluate how we treat all in our society, even those who have 
committed great offenses. Acknowledging the human dignity of 
prisoners, as the Court did in Plata, merely demonstrates a 
continued commitment and strong reaffirmation to one of the 
principals enshrined in the Constitution. 
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